Showing posts with label People. Show all posts
Showing posts with label People. Show all posts

Nov 18, 2009

Paralysis by Analysis...

By Jonah Lehrer

Success is intimidating. When we compete against someone who's supposed to be better than us, we start to get nervous, and then we start to worry, and then we start to make stupid mistakes. That, at least, is the lesson of a new working paper by Jennifer Brown, a professor at the Kellogg school.

Brown demonstrated this psychological flaw by analyzing data from every player in every PGA tournament from 1999 to 2006. The reason she chose golf is that Tiger Woods is an undisputed superstar, the most intimidating competitor in modern sports. (In 2007, Golf Digest noted that Woods finished with 19.62 points in the World Golf Ranking, more than twice as many as his closest rival. This meant that "he had enough points to be both No. 1 and No. 2.") Brown also notes that "golf is an excellent setting in which to examine tournament theory and superstars in rank-order events, since effort relates relatively directly to scores and performance measures are not confounded by team dynamics." In other words, every golfer golfs alone.

Despite the individualistic nature of the sport, the presence of Woods in the tournament had a powerful effect. Interestingly, Brown found that playing against Woods resulted in significantly decreased performance. When the superstar entered a tournament, every other golfer took, on average, 0.8 more strokes. This effect was even more pronounced when Woods was playing well. Based on this data, Brown calculated that the superstar effect boosted Woods' PGA earnings by nearly five million dollars.

Brown argues that this phenomenon is caused when "competitors scale back their effort in events where they believe Woods will surely win." After all, why waste energy and angst on an impossible contest?

That hypothesis is certainly possible, but I'd argue that the superstar effect has more to do with "paralysis by analysis" than with decreased motivation. I'd bet that playing with Tiger Woods makes golfers extra self-conscious, and that such self-consciousness leads to choking and decreased performance. The problem, then, isn't that golfers aren't trying hard enough when playing against Tiger - it's that they're trying too hard. I wrote about this mental challenge in the London Observer earlier this year:

Scientists have begun to uncover the causes of choking, diagnosing the particular mental differences that allow some people to succeed while others wither in the spotlight. Although it might seem like an amorphous category of failure, their work has revealed that choking is triggered by a specific mental mistake: thinking too much.


The sequence of events typically goes like this: when people get nervous about performing, they become self-conscious. They start to fixate on themselves, trying to make sure that they don't make any mistakes. This can be lethal for a performer. The bowler concentrates too much on his action and loses control of the ball. The footballer misses the penalty by a mile. In each instance, the natural fluidity of performance is lost; the grace of talent disappears.

Sian Beilock, a professor of psychology at the University of Chicago, has helped illuminate the anatomy of choking. She uses golf as her experimental paradigm. When people are learning how to putt, it can seem daunting. There are just so many things to think about. Golfers need to assess the lay of the green, calculate the line of the ball, and get a feel for the grain of the turf. Then they have to monitor their putting motion and make sure that they hit the ball with a smooth, straight stroke. For an inexperienced player, a golf putt can seem unbearably hard, like a life-sized trigonometry problem.

But the mental exertion pays off, at least at first. Beilock has shown that novices hit better putts when they consciously reflect on their actions. The more time they spend thinking about the putt, the more likely they are to hole the ball. By concentrating on their game, by paying attention to the mechanics of their stroke, they can avoid beginner's mistakes.

A little experience, however, changes everything. After golfers have learned how to putt - once they have memorised the necessary movements - analysing the stroke is a waste of time. The brain already knows what to do. It automatically computes the slope of the green, settles on the best putting angle, and decides how hard to hit the ball. Bradley Hatfield, a professor of kinesiology and psychology at the University of Maryland, has monitored the brain wave activity of expert athletes during performance. (Because the subjects have to wear a bulky plastic cap full of electrodes, Hatfield can only study golfers, archers and Olympic rifle shooters.) While the brain waves of beginners show lots of erratic spikes and haphazard rhythms - this is the neural signature of a mind that is humming with conscious thoughts - the minds of expert athletes look strangely serene. When they are performing, they exhibit a rare mental tranquility, as their brain deliberately ignores interruptions from the outside world. This is neurological evidence, Hatfield says, of "the zone", that trance-like mindset which allows experts to perform at peak levels. (As the corporate motto says, the best athletes don't think: they just do it.)

Beilock's data further demonstrate the benefits of relying on the automatic brain when playing a familiar sport. She found that when experienced golfers are forced to think about their putts, they hit significantly worse shots. All those conscious thoughts erase their years of practice. "We bring expert golfers into our lab, we tell them to pay attention to a particular part of their swing, and they just screw up," Beilock says. "When you are at a high level, your skills become somewhat automated. You don't need to pay attention to every step in what you're doing."

This is what happens when people "choke". The part of their brain that monitors their behaviour starts to interfere with actions that are normally made without thinking. Performers begin second guessing skills that they have honed through years of practice. The worst part about choking is that it tends to spiral. The failures build upon each other, so a stressful situation is made more stressful.

Oct 7, 2009

On Hiring and Delegation

Below is the reproduction of an interview (early 2009) with Scott McNealy from Forbes.com:

Only a few companies know how to manufacture new CEOs. Scott McNealy has done it again and again.

More than 75 people--including a number of women--who have wound up as chief executives at technology companies trace their managerial roots back to time spent with McNealy, who was one of Sun Microsystem's four co-founders in 1982.

Currently McNealy is chairman of Sun as well as deeply involved with the nonprofit Curriki.org, which makes grade-school curriculum available for free on the Internet.

McNealy has long been a study in contrasts: He has a blue-blood education pedigree that includes an undergrad degree from Harvard University and an MBA from Stanford University, but he delights in an aw-shucks demeanor and named his children after models of American cars, like "Maverick" and "Dakota."

His managers by and large admired him--in no small part because he trusted them. "We weren't punished for making mistakes. We were encouraged to try bold moves," recalls Laurie Yoler, an investment banker at GrowthPoint Technology Partners who worked at Sun in the 1990s.

Carol Bartz, who has just taken on the top job at Yahoo! and Eric Schmidt, chief executive of Google, are among the most famous McNealy alumni. Ed Zander, who ran Motorola, served as McNealy's number two.

Forbes spoke with McNealy recently about how to hire talent, how he advises managers and what he thinks of Carol Bartz and Eric Schmidt.

Forbes: What was different about how you managed Sun in contrast with other Valley companies?

Scott McNealy: I tended to manage by clear delegation. People got to be in charge of things. My decision-making process was not to make the decision but to decide who got to decide. And therefore I'd say, "Alright, Eddie, you're in charge of this decision. Go off and run a process and come back to us with your decision." If you hire really, really great people, they're going to know more about the problem they're dealing with than you will.

What did that leave for you to do?

I spent a lot of time helping and coaching people. When you make a decision, you have to, first of all, outline the problem. Then you have to consider the alternatives. You then have to be incredibly participative in the problem definition and problem proposal--get everybody's input--and then you have to decide quickly. You can't just grind it out and think about it and wait until it becomes explicitly obvious what the answer is. You've got to come up with the answer before the competition does. And so I put a lot of pressure on my managers to be quick decision makers.

Is that "consensus" management?

I call it participative but not consensus. One thing I always told them is: Everybody shouldn't necessarily agree with your answer. And nobody should be surprised. I always said, "I'll be very upset if you don't know how people are going to react to your decision." So that forces them to go out and talk to a lot of people.

How did you make people accountable?

We had a very strong annual planning process where we had a set of deliverables … including … an "interdependencies" section. It said: To make my plan I need to do the following but here's what I need out of my peers.

A lot of negotiation and conversation happens when you have an interdependencies sheet. And when [a manager] didn't make the plan, they'd go back and say, "Well, so-and-so said he was going to deliver on this and he didn't." That would provide some fairly interesting accountability inside the organization.

We had a million little management tricks and techniques that we used [in growing Sun from zero to more than $10 billion in revenues run rate]. You require some management tricks--structure, process, culture--to do that. And good feedstock. We made sure we were hiring good people and doing good reference checks … We had a thing called "sunscreen" that was our process for checking whether the resume facts were correct and whether someone had a police record. Just simple things like that. It's a really good idea.

What if a hire didn't work out?

It doesn't mean they're not good people. They were all good people when we hired them. Sometimes they'd leave on their own if they didn't feel that they were being appreciated. Sometimes they'd settle into a role more attuned to what they were doing. Sometimes we had to let them go because it wasn't working out right. But we never mistreated anybody out the door.

When was the last time you heard someone got "fired" at Sun? If they break the law, they're fired like crazy. But our view is that everybody is trying hard, everybody's working hard, everybody's talented in their own way … and if they're not in the right role we should treat them with respect.

You might remember a situation where a company missed a quarter and publicly fired a couple of people on the earnings call. And laid the blame right at their feet. And the CEO says, "We're getting stuff done here. We're delivering accountability." That's just not the right way to go do it. Can you image the next staff meeting? You bring in the two new executives and say, "Here's a towel. Wipe the blood off. Have a seat, and, you know, good luck. Have fun."

How did you pick who to hire?

My interview process … wasn't very scientific. Usually by the time they got to me they were pretty talented people. I would interview the person and--unless it was such a brain-dead obvious decision--I wouldn't let the moment get me. I'd let my mind process it while I was asleep. I'd wake up the next morning, and if I was thinking about the person that next day at work, I'd hire them. If I went two days, and [someone] came back and said "What did you think of so-and-so?' and I said 'I haven't thought about 'em for a nanosecond. I'm not interested' [then they weren't hired].

I know that's a weird way ... and I wouldn't say it was 100% but whether they were on my mind the next day would have a huge impact on whether I hired someone or not.

What's Carol Bartz like?

She's tough, she can make a decision, she knows what she wants to get done. She's got a big smile, a big laugh, but she can be tough, too.

She'll have a lot of competitors--including Eric Schmidt at Google.

Oh yeah.

How do you think that's going to play out?

[McNealy laughs.] I don't know. [Laughs again] Eric's super bright, too. Eric's got an intellect that goes forever. But you know, there's two kinds of smarts: There's intellectual and then there's street smarts. Carol's a real street smart person--not that she's not smart intellectually. She makes really smart moves. Eric makes very intelligent moves. It's very funny to watch. They have very different styles.

What else has been a key to Sun's culture?

We always had a cause. We always had a clear set of enemies. We always wanted a diversity of backgrounds, ideas and cultures. But we wanted to have commonality of purpose. A lot of those good leaders who came out of Sun understood and knew what I was trying to do when I picked an enemy, or when I picked a cause or when I put all the wood behind one arrowhead. It was about trying to align a bunch of really different people around a commonality of purpose. That's what really great leaders do. Steve Jobs does that with insanely great products. We did it with our commitment to eliminating the digital divide without doing harm to the planet and our focus on sharing. Those are very powerful ideas that can align a lot of different people with different backgrounds.

You were famous for "top 10" lists. What are your top 10 rules for managers?

I'll give you a few:

--Kick butt and have fun

--Be participative but not consensus

--To ask is to seek denial

--The right answer is the best answer, the wrong answer is second best. No answer is the worst.

--Yes or no?

I used to beg people to answer a yes or no question with a "yes" or a "no." If you watch any CEO ask a simple yes or no question of somebody on their staff, I don't care who they are, 999,999 out of a million won't say "yes," or "no." They'll launch into an answer. I used to laugh and say, "I'll take that as a 'no.'" or "Was that a 'yes'?"

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